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Abstract
This paper explores the limitations of intention-based social preferences as an ex-
planation of gift-exchange between a ﬁrm and a worker. In a framework with one self-
interested and one reciprocal player, gift-giving never arises in equilibrium. Instead,
any equilibrium in a large class of multi-stage games must involve mutually unkind
behavior of both players. Besides gift-exchange, this class of games also includes moral
hazard models and the rotten kid framework. Even though equilibrium behavior may
appear positively reciprocal in some of these games, the self-interested player never
beneﬁts from reciprocity. We discuss the relation of these results to the theoretical and
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1 Introduction
Can ﬁrms proﬁt from the social preferences and fairness concerns of their employees? An
extensive literature, both theoretical and experimental, has answered in the aﬃrmative. In an
inﬂuential theoretical paper, Akerlof (1982) has proposed that a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm may
beneﬁt from giving gifts to its employees, who acquire “sentiment for the ﬁrm” (p. 542) and
reciprocate by providing more eﬀort. A subsequent literature on worker-ﬁrm relations has
applied various diﬀerent theoretical models of social behavior that generate proﬁtable gift-
exchange.1 Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993) have ﬁrst provided experimental evidence in
favor of the gift-exchange hypothesis. They conclude that “...if workers behave reciprocally,
paying high (fair) wages is not proﬁt reducing but proﬁt increasing” (p. 452), and they also
ﬁnd that reciprocity enhances eﬃciency. Similar results have later been found in many other
experimental studies.2
This paper adds a more pessimistic view to the discussion. We analyze theoretically the
interaction between one self-interested player, typically interpreted as a proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrm, and one reciprocal player, typically interpreted as a worker. The worker is assumed
to have intention-based social preferences (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004).
Models of intention-based social preferences incorporate the idea that agents beneﬁt from
reciprocating (or punishing) acts to which they attribute good (or bad) intentions.3 Most
contributions that deal with gift-exchange in employment relations mention intention-based
social preferences as a possible justiﬁcation, although few actually model them explicitly.
Relying on the solution concept of an intentions-equilibrium, we show that any outcome in a
large class of games must involve mutual unkindness, which implies that positive reciprocity
is precluded. In a simple gift-exchange game, for instance, if the ﬁrm’s gift were able to raise
the worker’s eﬀort to a proﬁtable level, then giving the gift would be in the ﬁrm’s self-interest
and no longer be associated with good intentions, contradicting the initial assumption that
it raises the worker’s eﬀort. Ultimately, the equilibrium outcome must therefore involve no
gift and no returned favor. Importantly, unkindness is an emerging equilibrium property and
hence endogenous. Though players have ample opportunity to be kind, they choose not to.
1Rabin (1993) and Ruﬄe (1999) contain gift-exchange applications in psychological game frameworks
(Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1989, Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009). Arbak and Kranich (2005)
and Non (2012) apply the conceptual framework of Levine (1998) to the interaction between workers and
ﬁrms. Englmaier and Leider (2012) and Bellemare and Shearer (2011) are additional models of reciprocity
in employment relations. A general survey of reciprocity models is given by Sobel (2005).
2See Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder (2009) for a survey.
3Evidence suggests that social preferences in fact exhibit a strong intention-based component, see for
instance Charness and Rabin (2002), Oﬀerman (2002), Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003), McCabe, Rigdon,
and Smith (2003), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2008) and Dohmen, Falk,
Huﬀman, and Sunde (2009).
1
By the same argument, the equilibrium wage in a simple moral hazard game will never be
kind. Interestingly, it will still be higher than theory predicts for a selﬁsh worker. The high
wage is, however, not paid to trigger the return of a favor, but to prevent the worker from
punishing too strongly the ﬁrm’s lack of good intentions. The payoﬀ consequences are quite
surprising. The player who beneﬁts in material terms is the worker, while the ﬁrm loses.
This stands in stark contrast to the view described in the beginning. The intuition is simple:
Reciprocity increases the elasticity of eﬀorts with respect to wages, because of the additional
psychological payoﬀs the worker obtains from reacting to higher wages with higher eﬀort.
This makes larger wages attractive for the ﬁrm. However, reciprocity also has a negative
level eﬀect on eﬀorts, because of the psychological motive to punish the unkind behavior
that arises in equilibrium. This explains the negative eﬀect on proﬁts, and an ambiguous
overall eﬀect on eﬀorts.
Our analysis also relates to the rotten kid theorem (Becker 1974, 1981), one of the
earliest results in the theory of social preferences. Becker considers a framework where an
egoistic player (the “rotten kid”) can take an action that increases joint (“family”) income,
but reduces his own income, before an altruistic player (the “parent”) makes a transfer to the
kid. According to the rotten kid theorem, such one-sided altruism can induce an eﬃcient
outcome, because the kid can expect being rewarded for increasing family income. Benjamin
(2010) has shown that the eﬃciency result continues to hold for a much broader class of
outcome-based social preferences beyond altruism, including inequality aversion (Fehr and
Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), which makes the result interesting for applications
beyond the family. In our framework, where social preferences are intention- rather than
outcome-based, it turns out that mutual unkindness generally prevents equilibrium from
being materially Pareto eﬃcient, again in contrast to existing wisdom.
How, then, can the theoretical and empirical ﬁndings mentioned earlier be reconciled with
the view presented in this paper? We will discuss this question in detail in Section 4. We will
argue that, while it is possible to generate proﬁtable gift-exchange in a variety of diﬀerent
theoretical models, this requires to make assumptions such as non-proﬁt-maximization by
the ﬁrm, or “extreme” reference points for fairness. Concerning the empirical ﬁndings, much
of the laboratory evidence might in fact be best explained by two-sided social preferences.
In contrast, some recent ﬁeld experiments seem to provide support for the occurrence of
negative rather than positive reciprocity in worker-ﬁrm relations (see Section 4). These
ﬁndings are in line with our theoretical predictions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we analyze a two-stage game as in
Becker (1974) or Benjamin (2010), where the materialistic player moves ﬁrst, followed by
the reciprocal player. We derive the consequences of intention-based social preferences for
2
equilibrium kindness (2.2), the distribution of payoﬀs (2.3), equilibrium actions (2.4) and
eﬃciency (2.5) in this framework.4 In Section 3 we explore the implications of these results
in two simple examples, a gift-exchange game and a moral hazard game. In Section 4 we
discuss the relation of our results to several other papers, and Section 5 concludes. Some
proofs and extensions can be found in the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Intentions in Action-Reaction Games
In this section, we investigate a class of two-stage “action-reaction” games with one ma-
terialistic and one reciprocal player. We will introduce two speciﬁc examples below. Our
framework is also similar to the rotten kid setup (Benjamin 2010), except that we assume
intention-based rather than outcome-based preferences.
There are two players. Player 1 moves ﬁrst and chooses an action w 2 W . The action
becomes observable and player 2 reacts by choosing an action e 2 E. Both W and E
are compact subsets of R, with minimal and maximal elements denoted by w, w and e, e,
respectively. In our examples, player 1 will be the ﬁrm that oﬀers a wage and player 2 will
be the worker who responds by supplying eﬀort. In a rotten kid application, player 1 is
interpreted as a child and player 2 as a parent.
A pure strategy of player 1 is simply an oﬀer a1 2 A1 = W . A pure strategy of player
2 is a function a2 : W ! E, from the set of strategies A2 = EW . We restrict attention to
pure strategies throughout the body of the paper. With behavioral strategies, the additional
question would arise how players attribute intentions to randomly determined outcomes.5
The material payoﬀs of the two players as a function of the actions are denoted by ~1(w; e)
and ~2(e; w). They are assumed to be continuous and diﬀerentiable on the interior of their
domain. We can also obtain payoﬀ functions deﬁned on strategy proﬁles, by 1(a1; a2) =
~1(a1; a2(a1)) and 2(a2; a1) = ~2(a2(a1); a1). An action proﬁle (w; e) is materially Pareto
eﬃcient if there exists no other proﬁle that strictly increases ~i without reducing ~j, for
i; j 2 f1; 2g, j 6= i.
Player 1 is interested only in material payoﬀs. Player 2 has intention-based social prefer-
4Appendix A.1 contains an analysis of a more general dynamic framework. Considering dynamic interac-
tions is important, as Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder (2009) have emphasized that reciprocity is magniﬁed when
ﬁrms and workers interact repeatedly. We can show that our negative kindness result holds for the general
dynamic model, under very weak assumptions on the kindness norm.
5See Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Sobel (2005), Segal and Sobel (2007), Battigalli
and Dufwenberg (2009) and Sebald (2010) for discussions of this issue. Our Appendix A.2 contains an
analysis of a gift-exchange game with behavioral strategies, for the two most prominent approaches.
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ences: She forms beliefs about the intention of player 1 and reacts correspondingly. We ﬁrst
specify how player 2 judges the kindness of her own behavior toward player 1. Conditional
upon observing some w, we assume that responding by e generates a kindness of
~k(e; w) = ~1(w; e)  ~e1(w):
Intuitively, by choosing e player 2 gives a material payoﬀ of ~1(w; e) to player 1. This is
compared to a reference standard, the equitable payoﬀ ~e1(w), which measures what player
1 who has oﬀered w deserves from the perspective of player 2. She believes to behave kindly
(~k > 0) when giving player 1 a payoﬀ above ~e1(w) and unkindly (~k < 0) when giving him
a lower payoﬀ.6 Before we deﬁne the equitable payoﬀ, we will specify how player 2 judges
player 1’s behavior, i.e. whether she attributes good or bad (or neutral) intentions to the
oﬀer of some w. We proceed analogously and compare the payoﬀ that (player 2 believes
that) player 1 believes to give to player 2 to an equitable payoﬀ. Formally, we deﬁne
~(w; c) = ~2(c(w); w)  ~e2(c);
where c 2 A2 is player 2’s second order belief. If player 1 oﬀers w and player 2 behaves
according to strategy c, then player 2 realizes a material payoﬀ of ~2(c(w); w). The use of c
reﬂects the fact that player 1 chooses his action conditional on his ﬁrst-order belief b 2 A2
about the strategy of player 2, who in turn forms a second-order belief c about this ﬁrst-order
belief, when trying to infer the intention behind an oﬀer of w.
The equitable payoﬀs are determined as follows. Let 1(w) = f(~1(w; e); ~2(e; w))je 2 Eg
be the set of payoﬀ pairs that player 2 can induce if player 1 has oﬀered w. Let E1 (w) be
the set of Pareto eﬃcient pairs in 1(w), i.e. it contains those payoﬀ pairs from 1(w) for
which there is no other pair in 1(w) with a strictly larger payoﬀ for one player and a payoﬀ
at least as large for the other player. Contrary to the concept of material Pareto eﬃciency
introduced above, eﬃciency here is deﬁned conditional on player 1’s behavior. This approach
follows Rabin (1993). Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) proceed analogously but invoke
a diﬀerent notion of eﬃciency. This diﬀerence is important, and we will discuss it in detail
in Section 4. Analogously, if player 2 follows strategy c, then player 1 can induce the payoﬀ
pairs in 2(c) = f(~2(c(w); w); ~1(w; c(w)))jw 2 Wg. Let E2 (c) be the subset of Pareto
eﬃcient payoﬀ pairs in the closure of 2(c).7 In our later examples, we will use the average
6In the generalized model introduced in Appendix A.1, the intended kindness of player i toward player j
depends on i’s strategy and i’s updated belief about j’s strategy. In the action-reaction game, since player
1 moves only once and the action becomes observable, we can identify player 2’s updated belief with the
observed w, so that the deﬁnition of ~k does not have to rely on a ﬁrst-order belief term explicitly.
7Since c is not necessarily continuous, it is possible that 2(c) is not closed. Considering the closure
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between player i’s largest and smallest payoﬀ within Ei () as the equitable payoﬀ. For
our general results, however, we only impose the minimal requirement that ~ei () does not
correspond to an extreme point within this eﬃciency set.8
(A1) (i) If jEi ()j  2, there exist (0i; 0j); (00i ; 00j ) 2 Ei () with 0i < ~ei () < 00i .
(ii) If Ei () = f(0i; 0j)g, then ~ei () = 0i.
Assumption (A1) would, for example, allow the equitable payoﬀ to depend on how costly it
is for the opponent to give player i a larger payoﬀ within the set Ei .
To specify player 2’s utility function, let F : R2 ! R be a function that assigns a psycho-
logical utility score F (~k; ~) to each combination of kindness ~k and belief about reciprocated
kindness ~. We assume that F (~k; 0) is independent of ~k, i.e. 2’s kindness has no impact
on the own psychological utility if she expects to be treated neutrally. We also assume that
F (~k; ~) is strictly increasing in ~k whenever ~ > 0 and strictly decreasing if ~ < 0, to cap-
ture the psychological utility gains from rewarding kindness with kindness and punishing
unkindness with unkindness. We do not impose any additional assumptions on F . Rabin
(1993) assumes F (~k; ~) = (1 + ~k)~. In our later examples, we will follow Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) and use F (~k; ~) = ~k~. Here, our more general formulation allows, for
instance, for decreasing marginal psychological utility, i.e. the function F is not necessarily
multilinear. Player 2’s utility is now given by
~2(e; w) + yF (~k(e; w); ~(w; c));
where y > 0 parameterizes the intensity of reciprocity.
Deﬁnition 1. A strategy proﬁle (a^1; a^2) is an intentions-equilibrium (IE) if
(i) a^1 2 argmaxw2W ~1(w; a^2(w)), and
(ii) a^2(w) 2 argmaxe2E ~2(e; w) + yF (~k(e; w); ~(w; a^2)) for all w 2 W .
Intuitively, player 1 must maximize material payoﬀs in equilibrium, given his correct belief
about player 2’s reaction. Player 2 must maximize her utility, composed of material and
psychological payoﬀs, in every subgame, i.e. for every conceivable oﬀer w 2 W . In evaluat-
ing the kindness of w, player 2 treats the correct second-order belief c = a^2 as ﬁxed.9 Some
of our results will compare the outcome of IE to the outcome of subgame-perfect equilibria
makes sure that E2 (c) is non-empty. This issue does not arise for 1(w) above.
8Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) work with the standard average speciﬁcation. The appendix in
Rabin (1993) contains a generalized model with assumptions analogous to (A1).
9This equilibrium deﬁnition is a special case of our more general treatment in Appendix A.1. The equilib-
rium is called intentions-equilibrium to distinguish our approach from the sequential reciprocity equilibrium
of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
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when both players maximize their material payoﬀs. We will refer to these equilibria as selﬁsh
equilibria (SE). We conclude this subsection by introducing two simple examples that will
be used to illustrate our general results.
Example 1: Gift-Exchange. In a simple gift-exchange game between a ﬁrm and a worker,
we have W = [0; w] and E = [0; e]. Material payoﬀs are given by ~1(w; e) = e   w and
~2(e; w) = v(w)  e, for some continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave function v that captures the worker’s valuation of the wage. The wage is a gift because
it has no direct incentivizing eﬀect. Assuming an interior solution, the Pareto eﬃcient action
proﬁle is characterized by the condition v0(w) = 1. We therefore speak of w as eﬃcient
wage; the choice of e does not aﬀect material Pareto eﬃciency.10 Denote the selﬁsh equilib-
rium by (~a1; ~a2). We immediately obtain ~a2(w) = 0 for all w 2 W , which implies that there
is a unique SE (0; ~a2) where no gift is given and no eﬀort is provided. This ineﬃciency result
has been the basis for much of the literature which investigates whether social preferences
can help to overcome ineﬃciencies in employment relations.
Example 2: Moral Hazard. As a second example, consider a simple moral hazard variant. It
will lead to additional insights on the relation between reciprocity, distribution and eﬃciency.
Material payoﬀs are ~1(w; e) = e(V   w) and ~2(e; w) = ew   e2. Intuitively, the worker’s
eﬀort e, which causes disutility e2, is interpreted as the probability of completing a project
successfully. The success of the project is observable, with payoﬀ V in case of success and zero
otherwise. The ﬁrm oﬀers a bonus w to be paid (only) in case of success. We let W = [0; V ]
and E = [0; 1], and we assume that V > 2, which implies that full eﬀort e = 1 is the
materially Pareto eﬃcient action.11 It is straightforward to show that ~a2(w) = minfw=2; 1g
is the worker’s material best response to wage w, and the ﬁrm will oﬀer ~a1 = minfV=2; 2g
in the unique SE (~a1; ~a2). It is Pareto eﬃcient if V  4, but ineﬃcient whenever 2 < V < 4.
10We could just as well examine a game with a unique eﬃcient eﬀort level and purely redistributive wages.
We have chosen our speciﬁcation because it is directly comparable to the rotten kid framework, where the
ﬁrst mover’s action determines eﬃciency.
11A binary version of the moral hazard game, with E = f0; pg, would be similar to the monopoly pricing
game in Rabin (1993). The main diﬀerences are our dynamic structure, the fact that proﬁts are decreasing
in the wage as opposed to increasing in the monopoly price, and the assumption that only one player is
reciprocal in our model. Rabin (1993) shows that positive kindness is impossible in the monopoly pricing
game. This result is driven by the fact that the consumer can never be kind toward to monopolist, by
construction of the game’s payoﬀs.
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2.2 Endogenous Bad Intentions
We ﬁrst show that equilibrium behavior must be mutually unkind in any IE of the action-
reaction game. This result is an important stepping stone in the analysis that will follow.
Proposition 1. Suppose (A1) holds. Then, in any IE (a^1; a^2) it holds that ~k(a^2(a^1); a^1)  0,
with strict inequality if jE1 (a^1)j  2, and ~(a^1; a^2)  0, with strict inequality if jE2 (a^2)j  2.
Proof. Let (a^1; a^2) be an IE. By deﬁnition we have a^1 2 argmaxw2W ~1(w; a^2(w)), which
in particular implies ~1(a^1; a^2(a^1))  1 for all (2; 1) 2 E2 (a^2). By deﬁnition of Pareto
eﬃciency of the payoﬀ pairs in E2 (a^2), we must therefore have ~2(a^2(a^1); a^1)  2 for all
(2; 1) 2 E2 (a^2). Under assumption (A1) this implies ~2(a^2(a^1); a^1)  ~e2(a^2) and thus
~(a^1; a^2)  0, with strict inequality if jE2 (a^2)j  2. Next, again by deﬁnition of equilib-
rium, a^2(a^1) 2 argmaxe2E ~2(e; a^1) + yF (~k(e; a^1); ~(a^1; a^2)) must hold. The second term is
weakly decreasing in ~k and hence in ~1(a^1; e), by the fact that ~(a^1; a^2)  0. To show that
~k(a^2(a^1); a^1)  0, with strict inequality if jE1 (a^1)j  2, we proceed by contradiction. Sup-
pose ﬁrst that jE1 (a^1)j  2 but ~k(a^2(a^1); a^1)  0, i.e. ~e1(a^1)  ~1(a^1; a^2(a^1)). Then by (A1)
there exists (01; 02) 2 E1 (a^1) with 01 < ~e1(a^1)  ~1(a^1; a^2(a^1)), and thus ~2(a^2(a^1); a^1) < 02
by Pareto eﬃciency. This is a contradiction, as player 2 would strictly prefer the eﬀort
level that induces the payoﬀ pair (01; 02). Suppose then that E1 (a^1) = f(01; 02)g but
~k(a^2(a^1); a^1) > 0, i.e. 01 < ~1(a^1; a^2(a^1)) under (A1). Pareto eﬃciency then again implies
~2(a^2(a^1); a^1) < 
0
2, a contradiction as before.
Consider the perspective of player 1. Whenever there is a conﬂict of interest between the
two players concerning the materially Pareto eﬃcient allocations that player 1 can induce,
he will avoid leaving more material payoﬀ on the table than necessary, which is unkind
behavior. Player 2 in turn does not expect to be treated kindly and does not beneﬁt from
being kind either. A kindness-neutral outcome is possible only if the two players’ material
interests coincide, so that payoﬀ maximization by one player simultaneously maximizes the
other player’s payoﬀ.12 Importantly, this result does not depend on the particular two-stage
model considered here. Appendix A.1 contains a generalized model of arbitrary ﬁnite-stage
two-player games with observed actions and without moves of nature (which also includes
normal-form games). We can show that negative kindness must prevail in equilibrium in
every subgame that is reached on the equilibrium path, under an assumption analogous to
(A1) and an additional mild assumption on the dynamic formation of equitable payoﬀs. In
particular, the timing of the moves between the players is immaterial for this result to hold.
12Rabin (1993) has proven that an equilibrium with negative kindness always exists in his framework,
among potentially other equilibria. We show that making one of the players materialistic eliminates any
possibility for positive equilibrium kindness in our model, so that only unkindness survives.
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The negative kindness result is in stark contrast to the rotten kid intuition outlined in
the introduction. With suitable outcome-based social preferences on the side of the parent,
a rotten kid anticipates monetary rewards for increasing family income. Maximizing joint
income then becomes the kid’s self-interest. But acts motivated by self-interest are not kind
and would not be rewarded by a parent who cares about intentions, so that an analogous
argument fails in our framework. As we will discuss in greater detail in Section 4, the
resulting IE share quite a few properties with equilibria under envy preferences (Dur and
Glazer 2008). This is remarkable as our model allows for both positive and negative emotions
a priori, and envy-type behavior arises endogenously.
2.3 The Materialistic Player Suﬀers
To investigate the eﬀect of reciprocity on the materialistic player’s payoﬀs, we now impose
an additional assumption that speciﬁes the economic substance of the game.
(A2) (i) ~1(w; e) is non-decreasing in e
(ii) For each w 2 W , there is a unique e that maximizes ~2(e; w) on E.
This assumption is satisﬁed by the two examples introduced earlier. While part (i) implies
that player 1 weakly prefers larger values of e, (ii) allows for the possibility that player 2
ﬁnds some interior value of e desirable, as in the moral hazard example. For the rest of
Section 2, we will assume that assumptions (A1) and (A2) are satisﬁed, without further
mention. Player 2 then has a unique material best response ~a2(w) = argmaxe2E ~2(e; w) to
any action w. As an initial step, we are going to show under which conditions she deviates
from this best response to punish player 1 for being unkind.
Lemma 1. Any IE (a^1; a^2) satisﬁes a^2(a^1)  ~a2(a^1). The inequality is strict whenever
jE2 (a^2)j  2, ~a2(a^1) 2 intE, and ~1(a^1; e) is strictly increasing in e.
Proof. Consider any IE (a^1; a^2). By deﬁnition,
a^2(a^1) 2 argmax
e2E
~2(e; a^1) + yF (~1(a^1; e)  ~e1(a^1); ~); (1)
where ~ = ~(a^1; a^2) is independent of e and, according to Proposition 1, satisﬁes ~  0,
with strict inequality if jE2 (a^2)j  2. Also by deﬁnition, ~a2(a^1) is the unique maximizer of
~2(e; a^1), the ﬁrst term in (1). Then, if ~ = 0, we must have a^2(a^1) = ~a2(a^1), because the
second term in (1) is independent of e. If ~ < 0, the reciprocity term yF (~1(a^1; e) ~e1(a^1); ~)
is strictly decreasing in ~1(a^1; e). Since ~1(a^1; e) is non-decreasing in e by (A2), we obtain
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a^2(a^1)  ~a2(a^1). If ~a2(a^1) 2 intE, then ~a2(a^1) satisﬁes the necessary ﬁrst order condition
@~2(~a2(a^1); a^1)=@e = 0. If, in addition, ~1(a^1; e) is strictly increasing in e, then the objective
(1) is strictly decreasing in e at e = ~a2(a^1), implying a^2(a^1) < ~a2(a^1).
The lemma states that player 2 reacts to the IE strategy a^1 with a weakly smaller response
than would be optimal from a purely materialistic perspective. The response is strictly
lower when player 1 is strictly unkind in equilibrium (jE2 (a^2)j  2), the materially optimal
response is not a corner solution, and player 1 actually suﬀers strictly from a reduction in
e. Based on this insight, we can now compare the equilibrium payoﬀ of player 1 between
the cases where player 2 is reciprocal (IE) and where she is materialistic (SE). Note that,
although player 2 must clearly play strategy ~a2 in any SE, multiple equilibria are still possible
because player 1 could have more than one best reply ~a1.
Proposition 2. For any SE (~a1; ~a2) and any IE (a^1; a^2) it holds that 1(a^1; a^2)  1(~a1; ~a2).
The inequality is strict whenever jE2 (a^2)j  2, ~a2(a^1) 2 intE, and ~1(a^1; e) is strictly
increasing in e.
Proof. We have that 1(a^1; a^2) = ~1(a^1; a^2(a^1))  ~1(a^1; ~a2(a^1)) = 1(a^1; ~a2), because
a^2(a^1)  ~a2(a^1) according to Lemma 1 and ~1 is non-decreasing in e. The inequality is
strict if jE2 (a^2)j  2, ~a2(a^1) 2 intE, and ~1(a^1; e) is strictly increasing in e, also according
to Lemma 1. By contradiction, ﬁrst assume 1(~a1; ~a2) < 1(a^1; a^2). Together with the above
inequality this implies 1(~a1; ~a2) < 1(a^1; ~a2), which contradicts ~a1 2 argmaxw2W 1(w; ~a2)
and hence that (~a1; ~a2) is an SE. We obtain the analogous contradiction to the assumption
that 1(~a1; ~a2)  1(a^1; a^2) when the above inequality is strict.
Proposition 2 shows that the materialistic player does not proﬁt from facing an opponent
who is reciprocal. His equilibrium payoﬀ in any IE must necessarily be weakly smaller than
in any SE, and strictly so whenever punishment actually takes place in the IE, which will be
the case except if there are common interests or punishment is not viable. Note the key role
of Proposition 1 for this result. The unkind behavior of player 1 leads to equilibrium punish-
ment, which in turn reduces his payoﬀs. This result stands in contrast to results obtained for
altruism in the rotten kid framework. For completeness, the following proposition conﬁrms
this claim with an altruism model that is similar in generality to our intention-based model.
We assume that player 1 still maximizes material payoﬀs 1(a1; a2). Player 2 is altruistic,
maximizing 2(a2; a1)+G(1(a1; a2)), where G is an arbitrary but strictly increasing function
of player 1’s payoﬀ. We are interested in subgame-perfect equilibria (a1; a2) of the game with
altruism, which we refer to as altruism equilibria (AE).
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Proposition 3. For any SE (~a1; ~a2) and any AE (a1; a2) it holds that 1(~a1; ~a2)  1(a1; a2).
The inequality is strict whenever ~a2(~a1) 2 intE, and ~1(~a1; e) is strictly increasing in e.
Proof. Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 1, it immediately follows that ~a2(~a1)  a2(~a1), with
strict inequality if ~a2(~a1) 2 intE and ~1(~a1; e) is strictly increasing in e. But then 1(~a1; ~a2) =
~1(~a1; ~a2(~a1))  ~1(~a1; a2(~a1)) = 1(~a1; a2), with strict inequality under the above conditions.
Since a1 2 argmaxa12A1 1(a1; a2) by deﬁnition of AE, we obtain 1(~a1; a2)  1(a1; a2),
which completes the proof.
Propositions 2 and 3 together show that reciprocity and altruism have completely oppo-
site eﬀects concerning player 1’s payoﬀ. This can have quite important implications. For
example, we could conclude that a proﬁt-maximizing principal should try to hire altruistic
agents because he can exploit their social preferences, while he should stay away from agents
with intention-based social preferences as in our model.
2.4 Equilibrium Actions
Let us now examine how reciprocity aﬀects the equilibrium actions. The upshot of the
analysis will be that reciprocity typically has a positive eﬀect on player 1’s action, e.g. the
equilibrium wage, while the eﬀect on player 2’s action, the eﬀort, is more ambiguous. In this
subsection, we will impose some additional but standard properties on the payoﬀ functions,
which are also satisﬁed by our previous examples.
(A3) (i) ~1(w; e) is submodular on W  E.
(ii) ~2(e; w) is supermodular on E W .
(iii) ~1(w; e) is weakly concave in e.
In particular, part (ii) of the assumption implies that player 2’s material best response is
weakly increasing in w. Part (i) requires the opposite for player 1, i.e. increasing w becomes
weakly more costly for player 1 when e is larger.
For clarity, the following proposition applies to the simpliﬁed case when there is a unique
SE (~a1; ~a2), i.e. a unique value of w 2 W that maximizes ~1(w; ~a2(w)). The result is readily
generalizable to allow for multiple SE, with its conclusion becoming a comparison between
largest and/or smallest wages across equilibria.
Proposition 4. Suppose (A3) holds and ~1(~a1; e) is strictly increasing in e. Then ~a1  a^1
holds for any IE (a^1; a^2) in which (w) = ~a2(w)   a^2(w) is weakly decreasing in w for all
w  ~a1 or for all w  a^1.
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Proof. Step 1. First we show that a^2(~a1)  ~a2(~a1) must hold. For a contradiction, assume
a^2(~a1) > ~a2(~a1). Then, 1(~a1; ~a2) = ~1(~a1; ~a2(~a1)) < ~1(~a1; a^2(~a1)) under our assumptions.
Since a^1 2 argmaxw2W ~1(w; a^2(w)) by deﬁnition of IE, ~1(~a1; a^2(~a1))  ~1(a^1; a^2(a^1)) =
1(a^1; a^2) must hold, which implies 1(~a1; ~a2) < 1(a^1; a^2) and contradicts Proposition 2.
Step 2. To prove the proposition, we are going to show that, for any w < ~a1, it holds that
~1(~a1; ~a2(~a1))   ~1(w; ~a2(w))  ~1(~a1; a^2(~a1))   ~1(w; a^2(w)). The LHS of this inequality is
strictly positive by deﬁnition of ~a1 as the unique maximizer of ~1(w; ~a2(w)). Then, if the
inequality holds, the RHS must also be strictly positive. But ~1(~a1; a^2(~a1))   ~1(a^1; a^2(a^1))
cannot be strictly positive, again because a^1 maximizes ~1(w; a^2(w)). Hence, once the in-
equality has been established, we know that a^1  ~a1, which is the desired conclusion.
The inequality can be rearranged to ~1(~a1; ~a2(~a1))   ~1(~a1; a^2(~a1))  ~1(w; ~a2(w))  
~1(w; a^2(w)). Now, ~1(~a1; ~a2(~a1)) ~1(~a1; a^2(~a1))  ~1(w; ~a2(~a1)) ~1(w; a^2(~a1)) holds due to
w < ~a1 and a^2(~a1)  ~a2(~a1) from step 1, and submodularity of ~1 ((A3)(i)). Supermodularity
of ~2 ((A3)(ii)) implies that ~a2(w)  ~a2(~a1). Then, concavity of ~1 in e ((A3)(iii)) implies
that ~1(w; ~a2(~a1))   ~1(w; a^2(~a1))  ~1(w; ~a2(w))   ~1(w; a^2(~a1)   ~a2(~a1) + ~a2(w)). Now
observe that a^2(w)  a^2(~a1)   ~a2(~a1) + ~a2(w), which follows immediately from the fact
that (w) is decreasing in w for w  ~a1. Thus ~1(w; ~a2(w))   ~1(w; a^2(~a1)   ~a2(~a1) +
~a2(w))  ~1(w; ~a2(w)) ~1(w; a^2(w)). Combining all these inequalities yields ~1(~a1; ~a2(~a1)) 
~1(~a1; a^2(~a1))  ~1(w; ~a2(w))  ~1(w; a^2(w)), which is the desired result. The proof based on
(w) being decreasing for all w  a^1 is analogous.
The proposition applies to all those IE in which the punishment(w) is weakly decreasing
over a suitable range of wages. These are equilibria that preserve a certain property of the SE,
namely that increasing w reduces unkindness when taking player 2’s reaction into account,
and hence leads player 2 to punish less. The proposition tells us that we can indeed expect
reciprocity to have a positive impact on the level of a1, e.g. on the ﬁrm’s wage or on the
beneﬁcial action of a rotten kid, despite the fact that there is no benevolent gift-giving in
our model. To grasp the intuition for the result, consider the case where (w) is decreasing
in w below ~a1. There are now three eﬀects of reciprocity that all tend to increase a^1 over ~a1.
First, we already know that player 2 responds with lower e to a^1 than materially optimal.
Because player 1 is expecting this, he wants to choose a higher a^1 by submodularity. The
second eﬀect arises from concavity of ~1: since e is lower, the marginal beneﬁt of increasing
a^1 to induce a larger e is larger. Finally, the fact that (w) is decreasing below ~a1 implies
that, for all a1 smaller than the SE level ~a1, the sensitivity of e with respect to a1 is larger
in the IE than in the SE. This again strengthens player 1’s incentive to increase a1.
This discussion also suggests an ambiguous eﬀect on the equilibrium action of player 2.
At the margin, inducing a larger value of e becomes easier for player 1, because player 2
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reacts more strongly to higher wages for psychological reasons. Inducing a given level of e,
however, is more costly for player 1, due to player 2’s punishment, which by submodularity
of player 1’s objective means that the payoﬀ increase resulting from a higher e is smaller.
2.5 Equilibrium Ineﬃciency
The previous results suggest that reciprocity can indeed work in favor of eﬃciency, for
instance by increasing the level a1 of a self-interested player’s action beyond the ineﬃcient
SE level. We will now turn to the question of equilibrium eﬃciency more rigorously.
As player 2’s utility is composed of material and psychological components, it becomes
necessary to elaborate on the appropriate notion of eﬃciency. In his analysis of outcome-
based social preferences, Benjamin (2010) distinguishes between material and utility eﬃ-
ciency. With intention-based preferences, the concept of overall utility eﬃciency is problem-
atic. Knowing the outcome of an interaction is not suﬃcient to derive psychological utility,
because it depends on the way the outcome was achieved. Hence a reasonable notion of
utility eﬃciency might have to include the game, i.e. we might have to deﬁne a class of ad-
missible games and deﬁne utility eﬃciency with respect to this class. Bierbrauer and Netzer
(2012) follow this approach in a mechanism design framework with intention-based social
preferences. Due to the complexity of the problem, here we refrain from analyzing utility
eﬃciency and focus on material eﬃciency only.
Lemma 1 has shown that player 2’s equilibrium action a^2(a^1) in any IE is weakly and
often strictly smaller than her material best-response ~a2(a^1). Since player 1 suﬀers from the
reduced response (at least weakly), this is equivalent to saying that player 2 punishes player
1 at an own material cost. Hence there is no hope to obtain an eﬃciency result in the spirit
of the rotten kid theorem for intention-based social preferences. This is stated formally in
the following proposition, which is an immediate corollary of Lemma 1.
Proposition 5. Consider any IE (a^1; a^2) in which jE2 (a^2)j  2, ~a2(a^1) 2 intE, and ~1(a^1; e)
is strictly increasing in e. Then (a^1; a^2) is ineﬃcient.
3 Examples
3.1 Gift-Exchange
Consider the simple gift-exchange game introduced in Section 2.1, where W = [0; w] and
E = [0; e]. Since ~a2(w) = 0 for all w 2 W , it follows from Lemma 1 that a^2(a^1) = 0 must
hold in any IE (a^1; a^2). It then also follows immediately that a^1 = 0 must be true, so that
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intention-based social preferences do not help to solve the ineﬃciency problem.13 As in the
unique SE, both players choose zero values of their respective actions in any IE. Our analysis
in Appendix A.2 reveals that this continues to hold when behavioral strategies are admitted,
irrespective of their speciﬁc interpretation.
Rabin (1993, p. 1293f) presents an example of a normal-form gift-exchange game in
which equilibria with mutual gift-giving exist.14 This result is driven by the assumption
that both the ﬁrm and the worker have intention-based social preferences, i.e. the ﬁrm’s
goal is not the maximization of proﬁts. Falk and Fischbacher (2006, p. 305) also present a
result according to which gift and eﬀort are strictly positive even if only player 2 has social
preferences.15 In their model, outcome- and intention-based components are intertwined in
the deﬁnition of social preferences. We return to this issue in the discussion section.
Notice that we do not make statements about unkindness and eﬀorts in intentions-
equilibria oﬀ the equilibrium path. Eﬀort can be positive in IE for some non-equilibrium
wages w > 0, because such wages might be interpreted as kind by the worker. Our argument
is thus not driven by a general inability of the ﬁrm to exhibit kind behavior. It is driven by
the fact that a kind wage will never induce enough eﬀort to make it a proﬁtable choice for
the ﬁrm.
3.2 Moral Hazard
Now consider the moral hazard game from Section 2.1. To illustrate the eﬀect that reciprocity
has on equilibrium wages, we will ﬁrst explore IE of a cut-oﬀ form, i.e. equilibria where
a^2(w) =
(
1 if w^  w;
0 if w < w^;
for some w^ 2 [0; V ], and a^1 = w^. We calculate equitable payoﬀs as the average between the
largest and the smallest payoﬀ in the eﬃciency set, and we use F (~k; ~) = ~k~.
Proposition 6. Consider the moral hazard game.
(i) IE of the cut-oﬀ form exist if and only if y  2=((V   1)3=2   (V   1)).
(ii) If the condition in (i) is satisﬁed, there exist values wl and wh with 2 < wl  wh < V
such that a cut-oﬀ proﬁle is an IE if and only if w^ 2 [wl; wh].
13If a^1 > 0 was true, we would have ~1(a^1; a^2(a^1)) = 0  a^1 < 0  a^2(0) 0 = ~1(0; a^2(0)), a contradiction.
14Besides its normal-form, it also diﬀers from the game considered here because eﬀort is binary and the
speciﬁcation of material payoﬀs is diﬀerent.
15Falk and Fischbacher (2006) use the payoﬀ functions ~1(w; e) = ve w and ~2(e; w) = w e2. In their
framework, Schliﬀke (2012) shows that an evolutionary process will yield eﬃciency, but with a strong payoﬀ
disadvantage for the ﬁrm.
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Proof. See Appendix A.3
If cut-oﬀ equilibria exist, the set of possible equilibrium wages is characterized by lower
and upper bounds wl and wh. The lower bound wl is strictly larger than the wage ~a1 that
the ﬁrm would pay to an egoistic worker, and the reciprocal worker responds with maximal
eﬀort. This appears roughly in line with the theoretical and empirical literature discussed
earlier. However, the large wage is still perceived as strictly unkind by the worker, which
is an immediate corollary of Proposition 1. This contradicts the conventional interpretation
of high wages as kind and low wages as unkind or selﬁsh (see e.g. Card, DellaVigna, and
Malmendier 2011, p. 50). Here, the large wage is paid out of purely egoistic considerations.
The worker, in turn, requests this large wage because she would otherwise prefer to punish
the ﬁrm’s unkindness with reduced eﬀort.
It can be shown that the bounds wl and wh exhibit straightforward comparative statics
properties: increases in y and V both lead to increases of the lower and the upper bound.
Intuitively, when y is small, rather low wages suﬃce to make the worker resist the temptation
to punish. As psychological payoﬀs become more important, larger material payoﬀs and
hence wages are required by the worker to still supply eﬀort to the unkind ﬁrm. It is possible
to show that limy!1wl = limy!1wh = V , i.e. in the limit the worker eventually reaps the
complete gains from trade, although she cares less and less for material payoﬀs. Now consider
the eﬀect of V . The SE wage ~a1 depends on V only to a limited extent. It is increasing in
V for V  4, when the ﬁrm wants to induce larger eﬀort as V grows, but not beyond this
point. The picture looks diﬀerent with intention-based preferences, because the worker now
also cares for the surplus left to the ﬁrm. For a given wage, increasing the project payoﬀ V
makes the option of punishment more attractive, because the worker can deprive the ﬁrm
of higher proﬁts by not supplying eﬀort. A reciprocal player wants to be compensated for
not using this sabotage option, reﬂected by smallest and largest equilibrium wages that are
increasing in V throughout.16 These ﬁndings could have implications for job design. On the
one hand, we should expect jobs with more responsibility (as measured by V ) to be paid
better, even if they require exactly the same skills and eﬀorts as lower responsibility jobs.
On the other hand, employers could beneﬁt from systematically structuring jobs so as to
minimize potential for sabotage, even though sabotage is not observed in equilibrium.
IE with the cut-oﬀ property are materially Pareto eﬃcient because they induce maximal
eﬀort. For V  4 they share this property with the SE. If V < 4, however, the SE ceases to be
16There are counterparts to these comparative statics eﬀects in Rabin’s (1993) analysis of the monopoly
pricing game. The monopolist’s share of the gains from trade converges to one as production costs and the
material value of the good increase to inﬁnity. Also, the equilibrium price depends on production costs,
which would not be the case with materialistic players.
14
eﬃcient while cut-oﬀ IE continue to achieve the eﬃcient outcome as long as V and y are not
too low (so that the existence condition would be violated). In this case, one-sided intention-
based social preferences help to solve eﬃciency problems in our moral hazard framework.
Note, however, that this requires a relatively strong concern for reciprocity. At V = 4, for
instance, the condition for existence of cut-oﬀ IE already requires y  2=(p27  3)  0:91,
so the worker has to put about equal weights on material and psychological payoﬀs.
The moral hazard game also has additional equilibria that are not of the cut-oﬀ form. The
goal for the remainder of the section will be to illustrate one of these equilibria. We do not
attempt a complete equilibrium analysis. Instead, we construct an equilibrium numerically.17
Figure 1: Equilibria for V = 3.
Figure 1 displays the worker’s equilibrium strategy constructed in this way, for V = 3
and diﬀerent values of y. The SE strategy ~a2 is obtained for y = 0 and depicted as a dashed
line. The ﬁrm oﬀers the wage ~a1 = 3=2 in the SE, inducing the ineﬃciently low eﬀort level
~a2(~a1) = 3=4. As we gradually increase the reciprocity weight y, the reaction function of
the worker becomes ﬂat up to some wage threshold, after which it starts to increase towards
the maximal eﬀort level. As we further increase y, a discontinuity emerges in the reaction
17We proceed as follows. First, given some second-order belief c 2 A2, the worker has a unique best eﬀort
response to any wage. The ﬁrm’s preferred wage oﬀer can then also be determined. Under the (potentially
restrictive) assumption that the worker’s material payoﬀ is increasing in the wage in equilibrium, her equitable
payoﬀ can be calculated as the average between her equilibrium payoﬀ and the payoﬀ obtained for wage
w = V . Then, the ﬁxed point condition c = a^2 can be invoked to determine the IE, which can ﬁnally be
shown to satisfy the required monotone relation between wage and material payoﬀ.
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function, implying an upward jump from zero to strictly positive eﬀort at some wage level.
Note that the described strategy becomes increasingly similar to a cut-oﬀ strategy as y
increases (for intermediate values of y, however, the equilibrium coexists with the previously
described cut-oﬀ equilibria). Both the ﬁrm’s equilibrium wage and the induced equilibrium
eﬀort level are monotone in y. This corroborates that reciprocity works in favor of material
eﬃciency. However, full eﬃciency is only achieved for large values of y; the equilibrium wage
induces less than the maximal eﬀort when y is positive but small. Finally, the worker’s
material payoﬀ increases and the ﬁrm’s material payoﬀ decreases in y.
4 Discussion
Our analysis reveals limitations of intention-based explanations for kind behavior such as
gift-exchange between ﬁrms and workers. This of course begs the question what explains
the empirically documented emergence of such phenomena. We will organize our discussion
of this question along various theoretical models that generate gift-exchange equilibria. We
attempt to assess the validity of these models as an explanation for the empirical ﬁndings.
In doing so, we distinguish between evidence from the laboratory and from the ﬁeld. We
also delineate possible directions for future research.
4.1 Alternative Deﬁnitions of the Reference Point
Gift-exchange between a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm and a reciprocal worker can be generated
based on alternative deﬁnitions of the equitable payoﬀ. The role of the reference point is in
fact crucial for understanding a major diﬀerence between our contribution and other papers
that model intentions in moral hazard related environments.18 We have assumed that (i) the
equitable payoﬀ lies within the set of eﬃcient payoﬀs as deﬁned by Rabin (1993), and (ii) it
is not an extreme point of this set. In contrast to (i), the concept of sequential reciprocity
equilibrium due to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) requires to deﬁne Ei () as the payoﬀ
pairs achievable when player j 6= i can play any eﬃcient strategy aj (cf. the discussion in
their Section 5). A strategy aj is eﬃcient except if there exists another strategy a0j that always
yields the same and sometimes higher payoﬀs to both players, where “always” refers to all
histories and all strategies of player i. With this concept, the set Ei () would potentially
become substantially larger and include payoﬀ pairs that are in fact Pareto dominated when
18Von Siemens (2009) and Dufwenberg, Smith, and Van Essen (2011) examine intention-based reciprocity
in hold-up problems, and von Siemens (2013) analyzes the hidden cost of control (Falk and Kosfeld 2006).
In the model of Hart and Moore (2008), contracts deﬁne reference points and might always leave one party
ex-post angry and with a desire to retaliate.
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player i’s behavior is ﬁxed. As a result, the reference point would not necessarily lie within
the boundaries required by (A1), and equilibrium kindness would become possible even with
one-sided reciprocity. Consider a cut-oﬀ equilibrium of the moral hazard game, for instance.
Oﬀering a wage below the agent’s equilibrium cut-oﬀ value w^ would be eﬃcient. Conditional
on the agent’s actual equilibrium strategy, the resulting outcome is Pareto ineﬃcient. There
are, however, non-equilibrium strategies of the agent for which the low wage would induce a
Pareto eﬃcient outcome, in which the principal would obtain very large payoﬀs. Hence the
principal could be considered kind when oﬀering w^, even though he holds a correct belief
about the agent’s actual equilibrium strategy and in fact does not sacriﬁce own payoﬀs in
favor of the agent.19 To see the role of (ii), it is useful to consider the related contribution of
Englmaier and Leider (2012). The authors also model the interaction between a materialistic
principal and a reciprocal agent. In their model, any wage above the conventional level, such
as the market-clearing wage or the outside option, is assumed to be a benevolent gift and
reciprocated by the worker. Hence the agent’s equitable payoﬀ can be thought of as an
extreme point in the set of admissible payoﬀ pairs. Similar mechanisms are also underlying
the models in Akerlof (1982) and Bellemare and Shearer (2011). This leads to very diﬀerent
implications. Most importantly, the principal beneﬁts from reciprocity. As soon as he oﬀers
more to the agent than the outside option, the agent responds by behaving kindly.20
While these alternative deﬁnitions of the reference point facilitate the emergence of gift-
exchange equilibria, our approach clearly articulates an unease that seems to have worried
some authors before. For instance, in his interpretation of experimental results, Charness
(2004, p. 679) conjectures that employees might no longer perceive high wages as kind
once they realize that paying these wages is in the employer’s own interest. Fehr, Goette,
and Zehnder (2009) emphasize the importance of explaining the fairness aspect of wage
variations to the workers, and Bellemare and Shearer (2011) argue that gifts should not be
“clearly in the short-term interests of the ﬁrm” (p. 861). Ultimately, however, the problem
of the appropriate reference point model remains an important question for future empirical
research.
19Based on this mechanism, in Sebald (2010) a proﬁt-maximizing principal generates positive reciprocity
by oﬀering a high nominal wage that insures the agent against the risk of inﬂation, and in Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2000) a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm generates positive reciprocity by not hiring an outside worker at
a lower wage. Another mechanism is proposed by von Siemens (2013), where a worker with privately known
intention-based preferences reciprocates the behavior of a ﬁrm which is unkind towards herself, because the
ﬁrm’s behavior would have been kind towards a selﬁsh worker.
20Englmaier and Leider (2012) address the question of whether eﬀorts should be induced with relatively
ﬂat incentives, appealing to reciprocity, or with steep, strongly outcome-dependent incentives.
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4.2 Two-Sided Concerns for Reciprocity
Equilibria with mutually kind behavior and proﬁtable gift-exchange can also exist if social
preferences are two-sided, i.e. if ﬁrms also have an intrinsic concern for their workers. Several
intention-based models (e.g. Rabin 1993, Ruﬄe 1999, Arbak and Kranich 2005, Non 2012)
rely on this assumption.21
In laboratory experiments (e.g. Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997, Charness 2004,
Dhaene and Bouckaert 2010), the existence of two-sided social preferences appears plausible,
as the roles of ﬁrms and workers are taken by the same student subjects. Even if laboratory
subjects are good representatives of workers, however, a Lucas-type critique implies that
their behavior cannot necessarily be extrapolated to real-world employment situations, where
the ﬁrm might have diﬀerent motives than the subject taking its role in the laboratory.22
The intention-based model considered in this paper illustrates this problem transparently.
Field studies are less susceptible to the critique, but the motives that workers presume
behind experimental variations might still not coincide with those attributed to the same
variations once they become part of the ﬁrm’s ordinary compensation scheme. In Bellemare
and Shearer (2011), for instance, the pay raise given to tree-planting workers is explained to
them as resulting from the manager’s deliberate choice to share a windfall gain (p. 858f). The
workers’ reaction might be diﬀerent when the ﬁrm starts to exploit the identiﬁed behavioral
correlation. Again, this poses interesting questions for future research about the attribution
of motives to ﬁrms.23
21Rabin (1993) presents a labor contract example. Positive kindness is possible in this application because
both employer and employee are assumed to have intention-based social preferences. Ruﬄe (1999) studies
gift-giving, mostly focussing on surprise and related emotions in a non-strategic setting. In an extension to
a simultaneous game with mutual reciprocity, he also obtains gift-exchange equilibria. Arbak and Kranich
(2005) and Non (2012) are signalling models (Levine 1998) where preferences are assumed to be conditional
on the type of the opponent (Gul and Pesendorfer 2010). In these models, the existence of some ﬁrms
with social preferences might enable other ﬁrms to imitate and proﬁt from strategic kindness. Such pooling
equilibria can exist under speciﬁc circumstances in Arbak and Kranich (2005), but never in Non (2012).
22For related applications of the Lucas critique see Levitt and List (2007) and Bowles and Reyes (2009).
23Utikal and Fischbacher (2009) report on an experiment where individuals were asked to evaluate the
intentions behind actions of a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm: one treatment involved positive and one negative ex-
ternalities on a third party. They ﬁnd that, when the ﬁrm is in a dominant position and positive externalities
are small, positive externalities are perceived as unintentional while negative externalities are perceived as
fully intentional, broadly in line with our results. The eﬀect is no longer present when the ﬁrm has small eco-
nomic status, and the result is reversed if the positive externalities become suﬃciently large. The approach
of Utikal and Fischbacher (2009) is, however, not fully comparable to our model, for example because the
person to judge and punish is not the one experiencing the externality.
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4.3 Outcome-Based Preference Components
Gift-exchange can also arise in models of outcome-based social preferences. As discussed
earlier, for the case of altruism this has already been recognized by Becker (1974, 1981),
and for more general preferences including inequality-aversion it has been demonstrated by
Benjamin (2010).24
Outcome-based preference components are most likely another part of the explanation
of gift-exchange in the laboratory. The power of this approach to explain real-world gift-
exchange between workers and ﬁrms is probably more limited. For inequality-aversion to
generate gift-exchange, for instance, the ﬁrm’s gift would have to be large enough to gener-
ate advantageous inequality for the worker (Card, DellaVigna, and Malmendier 2011, Kube,
Maréchal and Puppe 2012b). Then, since intention- and outcome-based social preferences
alone have trouble providing a convincing explanation, the same is presumably true for mod-
els which combine both motivations, but this is another interesting path for future research.25
Dur and Glazer (2008) study optimal incentives when a worker envies the employer. While
the employer is risk-neutral and has purely materialistic preferences, the agent is risk-averse
and envious, with utility depending negatively on the diﬀerence between the principal’s proﬁt
and wages. As in our model, proﬁts decline as social preferences become more important.
The bonus payment is positively aﬀected by envy, and the eﬀects on wages (base salaries) and
eﬀorts are ambiguous.26 Hence our results for intention-based preferences are closer to those
for models of envy than to those for models of altruism or inequity-aversion. This similarity
arises endogenously in our framework, that a priori allows for both positive (altruism-type)
or negative (envy-type) emotions.
4.4 Alternative Theories?
One could also think of theoretical explanations for gift-exchange beyond the class of so-
cial preference models discussed so far. For instance, social norms might prescribe certain
customary reactions of workers to changes in the wage rate. Emotions such as gratitude or
24Itoh (2004), Englmaier and Wambach (2010), Bartling and von Siemens (2010) and Bartling (2011) are
treatments of diﬀerent moral hazard problems with inequality aversion and/or envy.
25Charness and Rabin (2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007)
develop theories that account for both intention- and outcome-based social preferences. Evidence for the
simultaneous presence of both types of preferences among laboratory subjects is provided by Andreoni,
Brown and Vesterlund (2002), Charness and Haruvy (2002), and Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003, 2008).
26Some of these results, such as declining proﬁts, can also arise when the agent is inequality averse,
provided she is worse oﬀ compared to the ﬁrm (see Itoh 2004). Dur and Glazer (2008) apply their model to
argue that workers should be given stock options in spite of risk aversion, that stock options for the CEO
have the additional cost that they increase worker envy, and to explain why the public sector (and non-proﬁt
organizations more generally) pay lower wages and use incentive pay less than the private sector.
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feelings of obligation might also be relevant.
At the same time, several recent ﬁeld studies (Gneezy and List 2006, Hennig-Schmidt,
Rockenbach and Sadrieh 2010, Chemin, DeLaat and Kurmann 2011, Kube, Maréchal and
Puppe 2012b) have found that, in the long run, negative reciprocity seems to be more robust
than positive reciprocity.27 This is consistent with our view that proﬁtable gift-exchange
should cease to exist as soon as workers are fully aware that the ﬁrm’s ultimate goal is
proﬁt-maximization. The fact that the laboratory ﬁndings are not too puzzling from our
theory’s perspective, together with the indication of considerably less gift-exchange in the
ﬁeld, suggests that a search for new theories might be less urgent than it appears on ﬁrst
glance. More empirical work about real-world labor relations will be necessary, however,
before deﬁnite conclusions along these lines can be drawn.
5 Conclusions
We have explored the limitations of intention-based social preferences as an explanation
for proﬁtable gift-exchange, by considering the interaction between a self-interested and a
reciprocal player. In a gift-exchange game, the equilibrium never involves gift-giving. In a
moral hazard game, reciprocity can aﬀect behavior in a way that superﬁcially looks as though
it involves positive kindness, because wages and eﬀort are higher compared to the benchmark
of two self-interested players. However, a careful analysis shows that this behavior does not
correspond to positive reciprocity. The agent still perceives the received wage as less than
equitable and punishes the principal accordingly. Eﬀorts are not high enough to compensate
for higher wages, and as a result the principal obtains lower payoﬀs than when he faces a
self-interested agent. Thus, even though reciprocity has important implications for behavior
and also eﬃciency, it cannot be exploited by a self-interested player.
Our analysis does not question the role of positive kindness in the lab, where two-sided
reciprocity is likely to be important. However, it casts doubt on the applicability of similar
reasoning in the ﬁeld, where there is less symmetry between players. Our analysis is thus
consistent with recent evidence suggesting that positive reciprocity is less common in the
ﬁeld than in the lab.
Suitable extensions of our model could be used to obtain results on organizational design
(Englmaier and Leider 2012, von Siemens 2011). For instance, experimental observations
27In the ﬁeld study by Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe (2012a), non-monetary gifts induce positive reciprocity,
while simple monetary gifts do not. Such behavior could arise in the model of Dur (2009), provided that
non-monetary gifts convey attention and are used for signalling by an altruistic principal. Dur (2009) argues
that monetary gift-exchange might work in the laboratory but not in the ﬁeld because principals prefer
giving non-monetary gifts in real-world employment relations.
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suggest that, if a principal gives the control rights for unpopular decisions to third parties, he
may beneﬁt because he is perceived as less unkind than when he takes such decisions himself
(Bartling and Fischbacher 2012). It would be interesting to see whether such behavior is
consistent with our framework. Finally, extensions would seem suitable to shed new light
on the longstanding debate on the boundaries of the ﬁrm. Nickerson and Zenger (2008)
argue that larger ﬁrms might suﬀer from increased costs due to social comparisons between
employees. From our perspective, changes in the numbers of employees working on related
projects may aﬀect their potential for sabotage and thus the potential adverse consequences
of reciprocal behavior.
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A Appendix
A.1 Generalized Model
In this appendix, we introduce a framework that generalizes the model considered in the body of
the text, by allowing for very general dynamic interactions. We closely follow Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004), with some diﬀerences to be emphasized below.
Game and Strategies. We consider a two-player game with ﬁnitely many stages, where the
players interact simultaneously every period and the outcome of the interaction becomes observable
before the next period. Sequential moves of the players can be captured by assigning singleton
action sets to players in periods where they are inactive. H denotes the set of histories, where each
history is a list of previous actions proﬁles. The symbol ? 2 H represents the root of the game. We
let Ai be the set of pure strategies for player i, with elements ai 2 Ai that are mappings from H to
available actions at the corresponding information set. Given ai 2 Ai and h 2 H, we denote by ahi
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the strategy obtained from ai by replacing all actions that are inconsistent with h by those which
are consistent with h, and keeping ai unchanged otherwise. Hence ahi is an updated strategy that
coincides with ai except that, everywhere along the history h, it prescribes the action for player i
that correspond to the subsequent element in h. In particular, a?i = ai.
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Beliefs. To be able to model the intentions that players attribute to each other’s behavior,
we need to introduce beliefs about strategies and beliefs. Using the notation of Rabin (1993) and
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), we denote ﬁrst-order point beliefs by the letter b, i.e. bij 2 Aj
is the belief of player i about the strategy aj of player j, for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i. Similarly, second-
order point beliefs are denoted by the letter c, so that ciji 2 Ai is the belief of player i about the
ﬁrst-order belief bji of player j (about the strategy ai of i). Beliefs can be updated exactly like
strategies. Given bij and a history h, let bhij be the new belief updated from bij , by replacing all
actions that are inconsistent with h by those which are consistent. Analogously, chiji is the second
order belief updated from ciji, using player i’s actions that lead to h. We again have b?ij = bij and
c?iji = ciji. All beliefs will be required to be correct in equilibrium.
Material Payoﬀs. In line with the earlier notation, let ~i denote player i’s material payoﬀ
function deﬁned on the set of terminal nodes of the game. We assume that the set of possible payoﬀ
pairs is bounded. Based on ~i we can also deﬁne material payoﬀs i on the set of strategy proﬁles
A = A1  A2, so that i(ai; aj) is player i’s material payoﬀ in the terminal node reached under
(ai; aj). For any history h 2 H, let i(ai; aj jh) = i(ahi ; ahj ) denote the payoﬀ of player i if the
updated proﬁle (ahi ; a
h
j ) is played instead of (ai; aj).
Kindness. Based on any collection (ai; bij ; ciji)i;j=1;2; i 6=j , we can now assign measures of kindness
and beliefs about them to every information set h 2 H. We denote by kij(ai; bij jh) the kindness of
i to j in information set h.29 We let iji(bij ; cijijh) denote player i’s belief about how kind j is to
him in information set h. For any h 2 H, the equitable payoﬀ for player i in this information set is
denoted by ei (aijh). Now, the kindness terms are
kij(ai; bij jh) = j(bij ; aijh)  ej (bij jh)
and
iji(bij ; cijijh) = i(ciji; bij jh)  ei (cijijh):
To specify the equitable payoﬀs, let i(aijh) = f(i(ahi ; aj); j(aj ; ahi ))jaj 2 Ajg be the set of payoﬀ
pairs that can be achieved if player i plays strategy ahi while player j plays an arbitrary strategy.
Let Ei (aijh) be the Pareto eﬃcient payoﬀ pairs in the closure of i(aijh). The following two
assumptions describe minimal requirements that equitable payoﬀs have to satisfy for every player,
strategy, and history.
28Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) consider n players but restrict attention to ﬁnite action sets.
29More accurately, kij should be called player i’s belief about how kind he is to player j, because it is
based on the belief bij . We refrain from using this formulation for simplicity.
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(A1’) (i) If jEi (aijh)j  2, there exist (0i; 0j); (00i ; 00j ) 2 Ei (aijh) with 0i < ei (aijh) < 00i .
(ii) If Ei (aijh) = f(0i; 0j)g, then ei (aijh) = 0i.
Assumption (A1’) corresponds to (A1) in the body of the text, and requires that the equitable
payoﬀ is not extreme in the set of Pareto eﬃcient payoﬀ pairs. This is obviously fulﬁlled by the
standard average speciﬁcation. Another obvious property of the standard speciﬁcation is that the
equitable payoﬀ depends only on the set of achievable payoﬀs for the player under consideration. We
only need two implications of this property for our analysis, which are formulated in the following
assumption.30
(A2’) (i) ei (aijh) = ei (ahi jh).
(ii) ei (aijh) = ei (aijh0) if ahi = ah
0
i .
Assumption (A2’)(i) ensures that, for all strategies which coincide except possibly along history h,
the equitable payoﬀ in h will be the same. As soon as we have reached h and updated accordingly,
these strategies have become identical, and so have the sets of potentially achievable payoﬀs. Hence
(A2’)(i) rules out that the equitable payoﬀ in h varies with the deviation that was necessary to
reach h. Part (ii) ensures that if a player has reached a history h, possibly by deviating from ai,
but then continues to play according to ai up to some later history h0, then his equitable payoﬀ will
be the same in h and h0. In particular, this also ensures that the equitable payoﬀs do not change
along the equilibrium path.
Utility. With a function F as described before, for every information set h 2 H and player i let
Ui(ai; bij ; cijijh) = i(ai; bij jh) + yiF (kij(ai; bij jh); iji(bij ; cijijh)) (2)
be player i’s utility in information set h, which is based on material payoﬀs from updated strategies
and contains the updated reciprocity term added with a weight of yi  0.
Equilibrium. Following Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), we require sequential rationality,
that is, each player must maximize Ui in each information set h 2 H.31
Deﬁnition 2. A strategy proﬁle (a^1; a^2) 2 A is an intentions-equilibrium (IE) if,
for both i; j 2 f1; 2g, j 6= i, and all h 2 H,
(i) a^i 2 argmaxai2Ai Ui(ai; bij ; cijijh);
(ii) bij = a^j ; and
(iii) ciji = a^i:
30While Rabin (1993) provides an assumption analogous to (A1’), our assumption (A2’) is particular to
the dynamic setup considered here.
31Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) rule out proﬁtable one-shot deviations only, while we preclude the
existence of any arbitrary proﬁtable deviation. This makes a diﬀerence with intention-based preferences,
which can be dynamically inconsistent (see p. 279 in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) for a discussion).
An equilibrium in our sense survives even if players can commit to multi-stage deviations, or if they lack
the sophistication to understand that a seemingly proﬁtable multi-stage deviation might no longer appear
proﬁtable later on in the game tree. In our two-stage model, the diﬀerence becomes irrelevant.
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The equilibrium deﬁnition in Section 2.1 is a special case of this general formulation. If player
1 is selﬁsh and moves only once, at the root of the game, his optimality condition boils down to
maximization of material payoﬀs 1(a1; a^2) = ~1(w; a^2(w)) by choice of an oﬀer w, given correct
equilibrium beliefs about player 2’s strategy. Each possible oﬀer w 2 W constitutes a history, so
player 2 must maximize utility for every w, given correct and updated equilibrium beliefs. Observe
that updating to history h = w yields ah2 = a2, bh21 = w and ch212 = c212. Substituting this into
player 2’s utility yields the simpliﬁed expression in Section 2.1, where Assumption (A2’) is used to
simplify e1(b21jw) = e1(bw21jw) = e1(wjw) =: ~e1(w) and e2(c212jw) = e2(c212j?) =: ~e2(c212).
Result. If one of the players is selﬁsh (say player 1, without loss of generality), the observation
that equilibrium behavior must be mutually unkind holds in our fully general framework.
Proposition 7. Suppose (A1’) and (A2’) hold and y1 = 0, y2  0. Then, in any IE (a^1; a^2) it holds
that kij(a^i; a^j jh)  0 for both i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j, and any h 2 H that is reached on the equilibrium
path. The inequality for kij is strict if jEj (a^j j?)j  2.
Proof. Step 1. Let (a^1; a^2) be an IE, and ﬁrst consider history h = ?. Since y1 = 0, player 1’s
optimality condition in h = ? can be written as a^1 2 argmaxa12A1 1(a1; a^?2 ). The fact that, under
assumption (A1’), it holds that k12(a^1; a^2j?)  0, with strict inequality if jE2 (a^2j?)j  2, now
follows exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1. Consider then player 2, whose optimality condition
in h = ? can be written as a^2 2 argmaxa22A2 2(a2; a^?1 )+ y2F (k21(a2; a^1j?); 212(a^1; a^2j?)). Since
212(a^1; a^2j?) = k12(a^1; a^2j?)  0, player 2’s utility is weakly decreasing in k21(a2; a^1j?) and hence
in 1(a^?1 ; a2). The fact that k21(a^2; a^1j?)  0, with strict inequality if jE1 (a^1j?)j  2, now again
follows as in the proof of Proposition 1, with the additional argument that payoﬀ pairs arbitrarily
close to (01; 02) can be induced by a proﬁtable deviation of player 2 even if (01; 02) 2 E1 (a^1)n1(a^1).
Step 2. Consider now any history h on the equilibrium path, i.e. that satisﬁes a^hi = a^i for
i = 1; 2. We then have that i(a^i; a^j jh) = i(a^i; a^j j?) and ei (a^ijh) = ei (a^ij?) for i = 1; 2, i 6= j,
the latter by (A2’). Hence kij(a^i; a^j jh) = kij(a^i; a^j j?) anywhere on the equilibrium path.
A.2 Gift-Exchange with Behavioral Strategies
In this appendix, we analyze the gift-exchange game from Section 2.1 when behavioral strategies are
allowed. As Rabin (1993) has already pointed out, the interpretation of a behavioral strategy be-
comes important with intention-based social preferences. We will consider two diﬀerent approaches.
First, we follow the mass-action interpretation of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), according to
which behavioral strategies reﬂect population frequencies of pure strategies. Consequently, the out-
come of a player’s randomization will be interpreted as fully intentional by the opponent. We refer
to this approach as “implicit randomization”. Alternatively, a player might randomize consciously.
The intention that the opponent attributes to such behavior will not depend on the realized outcome
of the randomization. Sebald (2010) has provided a formal framework that allows to model this
interpretation, which we refer to as “explicit randomization”.
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A.2.1 Implicit Randomization
In contrast to Section 2.1, let a1 be a behavioral strategy of the ﬁrm, which is a probability measure
on (the Borel -algebra of) W . Let A1 = W be the set of all such probability measures. We
will continue to write a1 = w for the Dirac measure for w, i.e. the measure that corresponds to
pure strategy w. Analogously, a2 is a behavioral strategy of the worker, which assigns a probability
measure a2(w) 2 E to every history w 2W , where E denotes the set of all probability measures
on E. We again write a2(w) = e for Dirac measures. Let A2 = (E)W be the set of all behavioral
strategies of the worker. The material payoﬀs ~1(w; e) and ~2(e; w) at terminal nodes of the game
are as deﬁned in Section 2.1. It is convenient to also write ~1(w; e) and ~2(e; w) for the expected
payoﬀs if the ﬁrm pays a wage of w and the worker reacts according to e 2 E. Moreover, we can
derive the expected payoﬀs 1(a1; a2) and 2(a2; a1) for behavioral strategy proﬁles, based on the
induced probability measure over terminal nodes.
The deﬁnition of the worker’s kindness toward the ﬁrm is a straightforward generalization of the
concept from Section 2.1. Given an arbitrary history w 2 W , the worker can induce the expected
payoﬀ pairs 1(w) = f(~1(w; e); ~2(e; w))je 2 Eg, and the equitable payoﬀ ~e1(w) for the ﬁrm in
history w is deﬁned based on the Pareto eﬃcient pairs from 1(w) according to assumption (A1).
Kindness is then given by
~k(e; w) = ~1(w; e)  ~e1(w):
Suppose the ﬁrm plays a1 and consider some history w. In the model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004), the worker now attributes the same intention to the ﬁrm as if the latter had played the pure
strategy w from the outset. Hence the worker forms the belief
~IR(w; c) = ~2(c(w); w)  ~e2(c)
about the intended kindness of the ﬁrm, where c(w) is the probability measure on E prescribed
by c for history w. As for the equitable payoﬀ, let 2(c) = f(2(c; w); 1( w; c))j w 2 Wg be the
set of expected payoﬀ pairs that the ﬁrm can induce if the worker follows behavioral strategy c.
Then ~e2(c) is derived from the set of Pareto eﬃcient pairs from the closure of 2(c) according to
assumption (A1). Observe that ~IR depends on the history w but no longer on the ﬁrm’s behavioral
strategy a1.
Deﬁnition 1’. A strategy proﬁle (a^1; a^2) is an implicit-randomization intentions-equilibrium if
(i) a^1 2 argmax w2W 1( w; a^2), and
(ii) a^2(w) 2 argmaxe2E ~2(e; w) + yF (~k(e; w); ~IR(w; a^2)), 8w 2W .
Proposition 8. In the gift-exchange game, any implicit-randomization IE (a^1; a^2) satisﬁes a^1 = 0,
a^2(0) = 0, and ~IR(0; a^2)  0.
Proof. Let (a^1; a^2) be an implicit-randomization IE. Let W+ W be the set of wages w for which
2(a^2; w) > ~2 for at least one (~2; ~1) 2 E2 (a^2), and hence 1(w; a^2) < ~1 by Pareto eﬃciency
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of the pairs in E2 (a^2). From a^1 2 argmax w2W 1( w; a^2) it follows that ~1  1(a^1; a^2) for all
(~2; ~1) 2 E2 (a^2), so that W+ must have a^1-measure zero. Let W  = WnW+, so that W  has
a^1-measure one. For any w 2 W  we have, by deﬁnition, that 2(a^2; w) = ~2(a^2(w); w)  ~2 for
all (~2; ~1) 2 E2 (a^2), and hence ~IR(w; a^2)  0. Since ~2(e; w) is strictly decreasing and ~1(w; e)
is strictly increasing in e, we then immediately obtain that a^2(w) = 0 must hold for all w 2 W .
Hence we have 1(a^1; a^2) =  !, where !  0 is the expected wage under a^1. It then follows that
a^1 = 0 must hold, since otherwise 1(a^1; a^2) < 0  1(0; a^2), a contradiction to Deﬁnition 1’(i).
The remaining statements then follow from the observation that, since f0g has a^1-measure one, we
have f0g W .
A.2.2 Explicit Randomization
Again, let a1 2 A1 = W be a behavioral strategy of the ﬁrm. In contrast to the previous
subsection, however, we now interpret a1 as a conscious randomization. In the spirit of Sebald
(2010), we model it as the choice of a randomization device that is observable to the worker. Hence
a1 can be thought of as the pure choice of a device which subsequently randomizes according to
the probability measure a1, and the worker observes both the chosen randomization device and its
outcome. Hence the worker acts at histories ( w;w) 2 W W that describe the chosen device
w and its outcome w, where w 2 supp( w) must hold.32 A behavioral strategy a2 of the worker is
therefore a function assigning a probability measure a2( w;w) 2 E to every such history ( w;w). At
a history ( w;w), the payoﬀ pairs that the worker can induce depend on w but not on w. Speciﬁcally,
they are given by 1(w) = f(~1(w; e); ~2(e; w))je 2 Eg as before, so kindness is
~k(e; w) = ~1(w; e)  ~e1(w)
exactly like in the previous subsection. Now consider the decision of the ﬁrm. If it believes the
worker to play c, then it can induce the payoﬀ pairs 2(c) = f(2(c; w); 1( w; c))j w 2 Wg, where
the expected payoﬀs i now take into account that the worker might react diﬀerently to some wage
w depending on the device w that has generated it. In contrast to the previous subsection, the
worker is now assumed to understand that, by making an observable choice of w, the ﬁrm intends
to give the expected payoﬀ 2(c; w) to the worker, but does not speciﬁcally intend the eventual
realization w. Hence we write the worker’s belief about the ﬁrm’s kindness in history ( w;w) as
~ER( w; c) = 2(c; w)  ~e2(c);
where the equitable payoﬀ ~e2(c) is deﬁned based on 2(c) as before. Importantly, the term ~ER
now depends on w but no longer on w, in contrast to the previous subsection.
32Formally, the support of measure w, denoted supp( w), is deﬁned as the set of wages w 2 W for which
every open subset S W with w 2 S satisﬁes w(S) > 0.
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Deﬁnition 1”. A strategy proﬁle (a^1; a^2) is an explicit-randomization intentions-equilibrium if
(i) a^1 2 argmax w2W 1( w; a^2), and
(ii) a^2( w;w) 2 argmaxe2E ~2(e; w)+yF (~k(e; w); ~ER( w; a^2)), 8( w;w) 2 W W , w 2 supp( w).
Proposition 9. In the gift-exchange game, any explicit-randomization IE (a^1; a^2) satisﬁes a^1 = 0,
a^2(0; 0) = 0, and ~ER(a^1; a^2)  0.
Proof. Let (a^1; a^2) be an explicit-randomization IE, so a^1 2 argmax w2W 1( w; a^2) by deﬁnition.
This implies 1(a^1; a^2)  ~1 for all (~2; ~1) 2 E2 (a^2). Pareto eﬃciency of the payoﬀ pairs in
E2 (a^2) then also implies 2(a^2; a^1)  ~2 for all (~2; ~1) 2 E2 (a^2). This implies ~ER(a^1; a^2)  0.
By deﬁnition of equilibrium, a^2(a^1; w) 2 argmaxe2E ~2(e; w)+yF (~k(e; w); ~ER(a^1; a^2)) must hold
for all w 2 supp(a^1). Since ~ER(a^1; a^2)  0, we again immediately obtain a^2(a^1; w) = 0 for all
w 2 supp(a^1). Hence we have 1(a^1; a^2) =  !, where !  0 is the expected wage under a^1. It
then follows that a^1 = 0 must hold, since otherwise 1(a^1; a^2) < 0  1(0; a^2), a contradiction to
Deﬁnition 1”(i).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Step 1. We ﬁrst derive the kindness term ~k(e; w). Since ~a2(w) = minfw=2; 1g maximizes the
worker’s material payoﬀ ~2(e; w) = ew   e2, which is strictly concave in e, we obtain E1 (w) = 
e(V   w); ew   e2 je 2 [minfw=2; 1g; 1]	. The equitable payoﬀ when w 2 [0; 2] is thus ~e1(w) =
(1=2)(V   w)((w=2) + 1), and ~e1(w) = V   w whenever w 2 (2; V ]. We then obtain
~k(e; w) =
8<: (V   w)(e  1) if w 2 (2; V ];(V   w)e  (w=2)+12  if w 2 [0; 2]:
Step 2. In any IE (a^1; a^2), the worker’s utility ew   e2 + y~k(e; w)~(w; a^2) must be maximized
by e = a^2(w) for every w 2 [0; V ]. It is easily veriﬁed that the objective is strictly concave in e
(for any ﬁxed w). The ﬁrst-order condition is identical for the cases w 2 [0; 2] and w 2 (2; V ] and
characterizes the following eﬀort level:
e(w) =
w
2
+
y~(w; a^2)(V   w)
2
:
Concavity implies that a^2(w) = e(w) when e(w) 2 [0; 1] and a^2(w) = 1 (= 0) when e(w) > 1 (< 0).
Step 3. Now consider a cut-oﬀ proﬁle (a^1; a^2) with cut-oﬀ value w^ 2 [0; V ]. We immediately
obtain E2 (a^2) = f(w   1; V   w)jw^  wg and ~e2(a^2) = ((V + w^)=2)  1. This implies
~(w; a^2) =
(
w    V+w^2  if w^  w;
1   V+w^2  if w < w^:
Step 4. Optimality of a^2(w) = 1 for all w  w^ now requires e(w)  1 for all those wages, i.e.
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y
V + w^
2

  w

 w   2
V   w
after substitution of ~ and some rearrangements. Since the LHS of this inequality is strictly de-
creasing and the RHS is strictly increasing in w, it is satisﬁed by all w  w^ if and only if it is
satisﬁed by w = w^, i.e.
y

V   w^
2

 w^   2
V   w^ : (3)
Since the LHS of (3) is strictly decreasing and the RHS is strictly increasing in w^, it yields a lower
bound wl for w^, implicitly deﬁned by
y

V   wl
2

=
wl   2
V   wl : (4)
It also follows from this expression that 2 < wl < V must hold. Analogously, the condition for
a^2(w) = 0 to be optimal for all w < w^ can be reduced to
y

V + w^
2

  1

 w^
V   w^ :
Both the LHS and the RHS of this inequality are increasing in w^, but it can be shown that the
slope of the LHS is strictly smaller than the slope of the RHS (since condition (3) holds). Hence
we implicitly obtain upper bound wh by
y

V + wh
2

  1

=
wh
V   wh ; (5)
which must satisfy wh < V .
Step 5. It remains to be shown under which conditions wl  wh holds, so that the requirements
for equilibrium existence can be met simultaneously. Fix wl as deﬁned in (4) and suppose we
evaluate (5) at the value wl instead of wh. Then the LHS of (5) would be (weakly) larger than the
RHS if and only if wl  wh, by the above arguments. Dividing the LHS of (4) by y((V +wl)=2  1)
and the RHS by wl=(V   wl) thus yields
V   wl
V + wl   2 
wl   2
wl
if and only if wl  wh. After some rearrangements we then obtain that wl  wh if and only
if wl  1 + pV   1. Substituting wl = 1 + pV   1 into (4) yields, after some simpliﬁcations,
y = 2=((V   1)3=2   (V   1)). Inspection of (4) reveals that wl must be strictly increasing in y, so
that we have wl  wh if and only if y  2=((V 1)3=2 (V 1)), which is the existence condition in the
proposition. Given the cut-oﬀ strategy a^2, the fact that w = w^ (uniquely) maximizes ~1(w; a^2(w))
as required in the deﬁnition of IE is immediate.
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